ABSTRACT. We show that in a unit demand discrete choice framework with at least three goods, demand cannot be additively separable in own price. This result sharpens the analogous result of Jaffe and Weyl (2010) in the case of linear demand and has implications for testing of the discrete choice assumption, out-of-sample predictions, and welfare analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Demand is frequently an aggregation of "discrete choices" in which each consumer chooses at most one good from among a set of available options. Economists sometimes microfound demand in individual choice models.
1 However, because the distribution of individual consumers' preferences is typically unknown, the functional form of demand is often not based upon an aggregation over individuals.
In this note, we show that abstracting away from the discrete choice basis of demand is not justified, as a large class of functional forms cannot be generated by an aggregation of individuals' discrete choices. Specifically, extending results of Jaffe and Weyl (2010) for the case of linear demand, we show in Section 3 that if individual-level choice is discrete among more than two options, then demand cannot be additively separable in own price. Thus in addition to linear demand, we rule out demand forms of the type used by Bulow et al. (1985) .
Our main theorem sharpens the Jaffe and Weyl (2010) answer to the Anderson et al. (1989) question of whether discrete choice can generate linear demand: we show that discrete choice demand must exhibit interaction between own price and other prices.
2 Additionally, as we discuss in Section 4, our results have implications for testing of the discrete choice assumption, out-ofsample predictions, and welfare analysis.
INTUITION
To see the intuition behind our result, consider Figure 1 . In this figure, consumers with valuations in the lower-right region (D 1 ) demand good 1 and those in the upper-left region (D 2 ) demand good 2.
When prices are (p 1 , p 2 ) and firm 1 raises its price by , it loses the demand of consumers with valuations in the regions B, X, and Y . Meanwhile, when prices are (p 1 , p 2 + ) and firm 1 raises Date: February 6, 2011. The authors thank John William Hatfield, Louis Kaplow, and E. Glen Weyl for helpful comments. Kominers gratefully acknowledges the support of a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, a Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Program Fellowship, and a Terence M. Considine Fellowship in Law and Economics. 1 Commonly-used microfounded discrete choice models include logit and BLP; see Anderson et al. (1992) and Berry et al. (1995) . 2 While Jaffe and Weyl (2010) ruled out demand for product i could take the form
they left open the possibility that demand for product i could take the form
The case of two goods.
its price by , it loses the regions B, X, W , and Z. If demand is additively separable, the induced changes in demand for good 1 following an increase in p 1 of must be independent of p 2 . Thus, denoting byR the mass of consumers in region R, we have
Analogously, if firm 2 raises its price by when prices are (p 1 , p 2 ) it loses regions A, W , and Z; when prices are (p 1 + , p 2 ) it loses regions A, W , X, and Y . We therefore see that
Adding equations (1) and (2) givesW +X = 0. As → 0, this corresponds to the requirement that f (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0. Thus, demand for goods 1 and 2 cannot be additively separable at (p 1 , p 2 ) unless there is a "gap" in the distribution of valuations at those prices.
MAIN RESULT
We consider a market with N goods indexed i = 1, . . . , N and a unit mass of consumers. The prices of these goods are p = (p 1 , . . . , p N ) ∈ R N . Each consumer has valuations for the N goods specified by the vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v N ) ∈ R N ; valuations v are distributed according to a continuously differentiable density function f . An outside option good, for which all consumers have value 0, is available; the price of the outside option is fixed at 0.
3 Each consumer purchases the good i which maximizes v i − p i , or chooses the outside option if v i − p i is negative for all i = 1, . . . , N . Demand for good i is therefore given by
.e. the domain for which good i is superior to good j. We say that demand for good i is additively separable in own price if there exist functions G and H such that
is additively separable in own price if
We say the demand system is additively separable in own price if, for each i, demand for good i is additively separable in own price.
Theorem. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and that f has full support. Then, the demand system cannot be additively separable in own price.
As we show in Appendix A,
which is strictly negative (implying non-separability) whenever the integral is non-zero for some i and k. The assumption that f have full support is sufficient for this conclusion, but is clearly not necessary.
4
To outline our approach and expand on the intuition presented above, we now prove our theorem in the the case N = 2.
Proof in the case
. This gives the following second derivatives:
Summing expressions (4)- (7) and rearranging terms, we obtain
As long as there is not a gap in the distribution of valuations at (p 1 , p 2 ), −2f (v 1 , v 2 ) is strictly negative. In that case, then,
cannot vanish, hence demand for goods 1 and 2 cannot be additively separable.
The N > 2 case is more complicated than the proof above, because of an additional term that vanishes when N = 2. However, that term is of the same sign as the term that is the direct analog to equation (8), so the proof is similar. When there is no outside option demand takes the form
We cannot simply normalize the price and valuation of a given good and call it the outside option because in that case we denote byp k what is really p k − p 0 , so additive separability in the normalized prices does not imply additive separability in the original prices. Nevertheless, with slight modifications shown in Appendix B, our proof extends to the case without an outside option.
DISCUSSION
Our results rely on neither global properties of the distribution of valuations nor boundary conditions -demand cannot be even locally additively separable unless there is a gap in the distribution of valuations. Previous theoretical work that has generated linear demand from aggregation of discrete choices has either had fewer than three options (as in Hotelling, 1929) or a highly restricted space of possible valuations (as in Salop, 1979) . Equation (3) implies that (on average) the cross-partial derivatives
are negative. Thus, ignoring interactions between prices by assuming additively separable demand will lead to systematic underestimation of the change in demand that occurs when prices move in the same direction. This bias shows the importance of microfounding demand systems in individual choice models. Below we discuss a few specific implications.
4.1. Testing of Discrete Choice. Our results present a simple test of whether a market is wellmodeled as a discrete choice setting with unit demand. Specifically, if i k =i
≥ 0 for all i and k, then demand does not arise from an aggregation of individual discrete choices. 
The same logic applies to economists' estimates of demand with only limited variation: estimates based on data in which only one price varies at a time are systematically biased.
4.3. Welfare Analysis. The bias we have observed is relevant not just for predicting a price change's effect on demand, but also for predicting its effect on welfare. The decrease in welfare from a given change in p i is greater when p −i is higher. This leads us to observe that there may be some situations in which assuming aditively separable demand is (approximately) appropriate. For example, consider the case of two single-product firms merging. Assuming additively separable demand will over-estimate the extent to which prices increase post-merger (since raising one price increases the demand elasticity for the other product, decreasing the incentive to raise its price), but for a given price change assuming additive separability will lead to under-estimation of the welfare effect. These two biases work in opposite directions and could, in theory, cancel out.
5 Unfortunately, however, such cancelation -and hence the appropriateness of the additive separability assumption -would be difficult to verify without a clear understanding of the microfoundations of the demand system.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
If each D i (p) is additively separable in own price, then
for all i, k. Thus, in particular, additive separability in own price implies that
To prove the theorem, it suffices to bound the left side of (9) strictly above 0, as such a bound guarantees that (9) cannot hold. We now derive such a bound.
Claim. The left side of (9) is bounded below by
Proof. As N ≥ 2 and f is nonnegative with full support, it is clear that the inequality in (10) holds. 6 Thus, we need only prove the validity of the claimed bound. Now, recall that for k = i, we have
Summing (11) across k = i and then differentiating with respect to p i , we compute that
Following a change of variables taking v → p + v i − p i , we see that
6 Note that in the case N = 2 (where there are no j = i, k), we use the convention that the integral in (10) is "empty":
It then follows that
Summing (12) across i and applying the identity (13) shows that
Finally, we observe that for any i, we have
7 Before obtaining (14) from (13), we must observe that, by relabeling,
Upon discarding one copy of the summation over = i, k in (14), 8 and collecting terms, we may use observation (15) to show that
As the right side of (16) simplifies to (10), we have proven the claimed bound.
APPENDIX B. DISCRETE CHOICE WITHOUT AN OUTSIDE OPTION
In this appendix, we consider a model of discrete choice without an outside option. We show that an analog of our main theorem holds whenever at least three goods are available in the market.
Goods i = 1, . . . , N , prices p = (p 1 , . . . , p N ) ∈ R N , and valuations v = (v 1 , . . . , v N ) ∈ R N are as specified in Section 3. Again, there is a unit mass of consumers and valuations v are assumed to be distributed according to a continuously differentiable density function f .
No outside option is available -each consumer must purchase exactly one good i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Thus, each consumer purchases the good i which maximizes v i − p i , and so demand for good i is given by
Theorem. Suppose that N > 2 and that f has full support. Then, the demand system cannot be additively separable in own price.
Proof. As we observed in Appendix A, own-price additive separability of demand for good i implies that
Now, for k = i, we have
Summing (18) across k = i and then differentiating with respect to p i , we compute that
The change of variables taking v → p + v i − p i shows that
This observation allows us to make a transformation analogous to (13), from which we obtain
Observation (15) shows that the second term of (20) is equal to
which vanishes because f is a density function. Thus, we see that
When N > 2, the right side of (21) 
